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Intergenerational Transfers and Savings
ABSTRACT
Inrecent years the role of intergenerational transfers in the process of
wealth accunulationhas been the subject of substantial empirical and
theoreticalanalysis. The key question stimulating this research is what is
the main explanation for savings? Is it primarily accumulation for retirement
as clainedbyAlbert Ando, Richard Bnimberg, and Franco Mod igliani in their
celebrated Life Cycle Model of Savings? Is it primarily intentional
accumulation for intergenerational transfers? Or is it primarily precautionary
,muchof which may be bequeathed becausG of imperfections in annuity
markets?
This paper exanines a range of findings on the Importance of
intergenerational transfers. The strong conclusion that aerges fruit this
evidence is that intergenerational transfers play a very Important, if not a
key, role in aggregate wealth accumulation. While intergenerational transfers
figure very large in savings, the precise rrotivation for such transfers is
unclear. Intergenerational altrui might appear the most likely candidate,
tnt at least sane stylized facts, such as the equal allocation of bequests
arong children, are strongly at odds with the altruisnnn3el.Other
explanations involving imperfect insurance arrangarents or pawients for child
services do not appear capable of explaining the substantial atnmts of
transfers actually observed. Sorting cut the relative contribitions of
different nadels to intergenerational transfers and the precise role of
intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accuriulat ion remains an




Cambridge, MA 02138In recent years the role of intergenerational transfers in theprocess of
wealth accumulation has been the subject of substantial empirical and
theoretical analysis. The key question stimulating this research Is what is
the main explanation for savings?. Is it primarily accumulation for retirement
as claimed by Albert Ando, Richard Brumberg, and Franco Modigliani in their
celebrated Life Cycle Model of Savings? Is it primarily intentional
accumulation for intergenerational transfers? Or is it primarily
precautionary savings, much of which may be bequeathed because of
imperfections in annuity markets?
The answer to the savings puzzle has many policy implications; certain
tax structures are much more conducive to some types of savings than others,
and certain government insurance programs might appear less attractive If
precautionary motives are the main explanation of savings. Knowledge of the
primary savings mechanism would also provide the key to understanding the
distribution of wealth.
Solving the savings puzzle requires first collecting the pieces and then
seeing how they fit together. A major piece of the puzzle is understanding
the quantitative importance of intergenerational transfers to the accumulation
of wealth. As I argue below, there is strong evidence that intergenerational
transfers play a very important and perhaps dominant role in U.S. wealth
accumulation. This does not mean, however, that intentional saving for gifts
and bequests is the main saving motive. Significant intergenerational
transfers could also arise in the Life Cycle Model in the absence of well
functioning private annuity markets or close substitutes for such markets.
Let us first look at the evidence on the importance of intergenerational
transfers and then turn to the deeper question of why such transfers arise.—2—
I.The Importance of Intergenerational Transfers to Savings
There are six types of evidence concerning the importance of
intergenerational transfers to savings. These are: (1) Comparisons of total
U.S. wealth with life cycle wealth, defined as the amount of U.S. wealth
there would be in the absence of any net intergenerational transfers. The
difference between total wealth and life cycle wealth is defined as transfer
wealth. These calculations use age—earnings and age—consumption profiles as
well as other data, but they do not use data on transfers since they are
concerned with what wealth would be in the absence of transfers, (2) the
calculation of transfer wealth as defined above using steady state assumptions
and the limited reported data on the flow of transfers, (3) zero transfer,
life cycle simulation models that attempt to reproduce in a realistic manner
actual wealth to income ratios or actual wealth distributions, (4) analysis of
the rate of asset decumulation of the elderly, (5) evidence from annuity
markets, and (6) historical evidence concerning the correlation of saving
rates and changes in the length of retirement. Each of these types of
evidence suggests an important role for intergenerational transfers in
savings.
A. The Calculation of Life Cycle and Transfer Wealth Components
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) considered the following question: Are the
U.S. data broadly consistent with the view that intergenerational transfers
play a negligible role in U.S. wealth accumulation? Stated differently, can
one reject the null hypothesis that the Life Cycle Model fully explains U.S.
wealth. To address this question we divided total wealth, W, into two—3-.
components, life cycle wealth, L, and transfer wealth, T, and defined life
cycle wealth of a cohort as the sum over each age of the accumulated
difference between past streams of labor earnings and consumption. Total life
cycle wealth equals the sum over cohorts of each cohort's life cycle wealth.
Let E and C stand, respectively, for the sum over cohorts of allpast
accumulated earnings and all past accumulated consumption, then:
(1) W =I.+T ,andI nE—C
With this definition of 1, T equals the sum over cohorts of the sum of
accumulated net transfers received at each age. Note that this is the
standard definition of life cycle wealth; it is the definition usedby Ando
and Modigliani (1963), and it is the definition used in the twopreceding
extensive studies of life cycle wealth accumulation by Tobin (1967) and
Darby (1979). It is also the only appropriate definition for testing the zero
intergenerational transfer null hypothesis.'
Calculating L requires knowledge of longitudinal age earnings and age
consumption profiles for each cohort. These profiles were derived using data
for the period 1900 through 1974 on cross section relativeage earnings and
age consumption profiles as well as aggregate earnings and consumption. The
procedure Involved distributing total earnings and consumption In each year by
age and SCX; combining these cross section age sex matrices of earnings and
consumption yields longitudinal profiles that are used to form E and C.In
our initial paper Summers and I reported a value of I for 1974 of $733
billion, which Is only 18.9 percent of total 1974 household wealth of $3,884
billion. We subsequently Identified an error in the treatment of durables.—4—
In Kotlikoff and Summers (1986) we indicate that a proper correction for
durables raises the share of life cycle wealth to 21.9 percent.
While the 21.9 percent figure is quite small, it is probably an over
estimate of the life cycle share of total wealth. In order to generate at
least some positive value for life cycle wealth, Summers and I adjusted
upwards standard estimates of the labor income of the self employed by 20
percent. Since the ratio of self employed workers to employees was
substantially larger in the prewar period than it is today, the calculated
value of life cycle wealth is fairly sensitive to this assumption. Using
standard estimates would reduce life cycle wealth by about $700 billion. In
addition, correcting several other intentional biases in our calculation would
produce negative values for life cycle wealth. These include our assumption
of a quite high ratio of female to male earnings, our assumption of zero
earnings after age 75, and our assumption that the age-consumption profile is
flat, rather than declining, after age 75.
It may be useful to repeat our basic explanation for why life cycle
wealth is so small in the U.S. Unlike simple class room depictions of hump
saving in which the age consumption is flat and the earnings profile rises to
retirement, actual age earnings and age consumption profiles, such as those in
Figures 1 and 2 which are reproduced from our paper, have essentially
identical shapes and levels prior to at least age 45. Between ages 45 and 60
there clearly is some hump saving in that earnings profiles exceed consumption
profiles; also after age 60 the age consumption profile clearly exceeds the
age earnings profile. However, this pattern of hump saving and dissaving (at
least relative to earnings) occurs quite late In the life cycle. Hence, one—5—
would not expect a large accumulation of life cycle wealth in the aggregate
since the life cycle wealth of the more numerous generations belo*'i age 45 is
so small. The simple fact is that consumption does not rise more rapidly
through life than labor Income.
An earlier study by Darby (1979), that influenced my study with Summers,
used cross section data on wealth, earnings, and consumption to divide current
wealth holdings into a fraction that would be consumed and a fraction that
would be transferred to succeeding generations. Darby concluded that at most
29 percent of U.S. private net worth is devoted to future consumption, with
the rest destined for intergenerational transfer. White (1978) used aggregate
data on the age structure of the population, age earnings and age consumption
profiles along with a variety of parametric assumption and concludes that the
life cycle model can account for only about a quarter of aggregate saving.
Though their accounting frameworks are somewhat different and though they use
different data, and only cross section data at that, Darby and White reach
essentially the same conclusion as Kotlikoff and Summers because the basic
shapes of U.S. cross section age earnings and age consumption profiles and the
longitudinal profiles that can reasonably be inferred from the cross section
profiles are quite different from those of the text book life cycle model.
8. Calculations of Life Cycle and Transfer Wealth Using Flow Data
The analyses just described directly calculate life cycle wealth and
indirectly Infer the stock of transfer wealth. Obviously it would be very
useful to corroborate these results with direct evidence on intergenerational
transfers. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) also examine the available flow data-6-
on intergenerational transfers. We presented a formula, which is valid only in
the steady state, that relates the flow of transfers to the stock of transfer
wealth.
There are three major problems with this method for calculating T.
First, the available flow data on transfers clearly provide a lower bound
estimate for total transfer flows; there are no data sources that
systematically report intergenerational transfers made in the form of implicit
and explicit gifts. Explicit gifts, which may be in kind as well as in cash,
are clearly acknowledged as such by donors and recipients. Implicit gifts,
such as making one's son an equal partner in a lucrative family business or
providing low interest loans to children, may not be viewed as a gift by
donors or recipients and would be hard to identify in a survey. Since the
U.S. distribution of wealth is highly skewed, implicit gifts, while perhaps
small in number, could be very large in value. Hence, any flow estimates of
transfer wealth, Including those of Modigliani (1984), should be viewed as
potentially seriously downward biased.
The second problem with using flow data to calculate I is that the
assumption of a steady state may be far from justified. It may be, for
example, that the flow of intergenerational transfers in relation to the scale
of the economy was much greater in the 3920s than in the 1960s and 1979s. Not
only must one assume that aggregate variables have been in steady state since
at least the turn of the century, but one must also assume that the age
distribution of transfers is time invariant.
the third problem is that the simple formula given in equation (2)
relating transfer wealth I to the transfer flow (the formula Incorporates—7-
Nodigliani's (1984) correction for a small error) assumes that everyone dies
at the same age D, that all transfers are received at the same age I, and that
all transfers are made at the same age 6. This is obviously unrealistic, and
it is not clear what choice of these three ages best approximates reality.
The appropriate choice of these ages depends on one's assumption about the
steady state Interest and growth rates of the economy, r and n, respectively.
If half of transfers are received at age 20 and half at age 60, using 40 for
the approximate I would be inappropriate; transfers received atage 20 should
receive more weight in the approximation formula because they are accumulated
for a much longer period than transfers received atage 60 and because the




To illustrate the implication of the formula, Summers and I discussed an
example In which U equals 55 (a real world age of death of 73 if the age of
adulthood is 18), (G—I) equals 30, and (r—n) equals .01. Because of our
algebraic error we did not assume a value for I. Using a value of I equal to
15 seems justified when r exceeds n, because transfer wealth depends on the
period of accumulation, and the appropriate approximation to I should be
smaller If r exceeds n. A similar statement holds for the choice of theage
gap (G—I); thus it seems likely that the choice of 30 for (13—I) is too small
given that r exceeds n. But keeping (6-I) at 30 and choosing I equal to 15,
the factor multiplying the flow of transfers, t, in (2) is 39. Since the
estimated 1974 flow of reported transfers is $45.4 billion, the "transfer—8-
flow" lower bound estimate for T is $1,771 billion, or 46 percent of 1974
household wealth. Note that using a potentially more appropriate age gap of
(G—I) of 45 would yield a lower bound value of I of $2455, or 63 percent of
total wealth.
One issue about this calculation raised by Modigliani (1984) is whether
payment of college tuition by parents should be counted as an
intergenerational transfer. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) defines the age of
adulthood as age 18 and treats all payments, either in cash or in kind
(including tuition payments), received from parents after age 18 as an
intergenerational transfer. Support of children prior to age 18 is considered
consumption by the parent. While one may argue about the proper age of
adulthood, given the fungibility of money there is no reasonable basis for
labelling parental tuition support differently from parental gifts of
durables, such as cars, or parental gifts of money; I.e., whether the parent
pays tuition or gives the child the money to pay tuition is economically
equivalent. In addition, there is no reason to classify somehow educational
expenditures as a human as opposed to nonhuman wealth transfer. The transfer
of funds to pay for education constitutes a transfer of nonhuman capital. The
fact that the expenditure leads to smarter or more skilled children as opposed
to, for example, to fatter children, Is quite immaterial to the issue of
tracing the origins of nonhuman wealth accumulation.
The choice of the age of adulthood is, however, arbitrary. While age 18
seems reasonable for the post war period, it may be too old for older 1974
cohorts, some of whom were born in the last century. Many of these older
generations entered the labor force at younger ages than is currently typical,-9-
and they certainly had a much shorter lifespan. Indeed, until the 1950s labor
force participation rates were calculated for the population over age 14. Had
Summers and I used a younger age such as 16 for the age of adulthood for older
1974 cohorts, we would have reported considerably less life cycle wealth.
C. Simulation Studies of Life Cycle Wealth and Comparisons with
Actual Wealth Holdings
Simulation analyses also call into question the pure life cycle model.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1985, 1987) point out, using a detailed life cycle
simulation model, that realistic specification of U.S. demographics,
preferences, and fiscal institutions implies an extremely small, if not
negative, wealth to income ratio. Their results differ from those of Tobin
(1967) because of their inclusion of income taxes and social security and
their more realistic assumptions concerning the growth rate of consumption
over the life cycle. In order to generate substantial life cycle savings
Tobin found it necessary to assume that consumption over the life cycle grows
at a much faster rate than actually observed. Tobin's calculations which
appear to come closest to replicating observed ratios of wealth to income
assume that consumption grows at a rate of 5 percent per year over the life
cycle. This rate is more than twice the rate actually observed (Kotlikoff and
Summers, 1981).
Other simulation studies by Atkinson (1971) and Oulton (1976) point out
the difficulty of explaining wealth inequality based on the zero transfer life
cycle model. To quote Atkinson, "It is clear from the analysis that
life cycle factors cannot explain the upper tail of the current distribution—10-
of wealth in Britain." Note that the upper tail of the British wealth
distribution in Atkinson's study accounts for about three quarters of total
British wealth holdings. Both Atkinson and Oulton indicate that the
substantial inequality in wealth relative to earnings can only be explained by
intergenerational transfers.
D.Asset Decumulation of the Elderly
Decumulation of wealth after retirement is an essential aspect of the
life cycle theory. Vet simple cross section tabulations of wealth holdings by
age, Hirer (1979) and Kurz (1984), or saving rates by age, Thurow (1976) and
Danziger et al. (1984), do not support the central prediction that the aged
dissave. Hirer and Kurz report that wealth holding tends to increase with
age.
Thurow reports positive saving rates for persons in all age groups, while
Danziger et al. report that saving rates increase with age with "...the
elderly spend(ing) less than the nonelderly at the same level of income and
(with) the very oldest of the elderly having the lowest average propensity to
consume." The most recent cross section study of consumption rates by age is
that of Albert Ando (1986); his regression analysis leads him to conclude that
"most families follow a reasonably well defined pattern of savings and net
wealth accumulation before their retirement, but they tend to dissave little
after retirement."
Cross section analysis of estate data by Atkinson (1971) and Atkinson and
Harrison (1976) as well as panel analysis of the estates of individual cohorts
by Menchik and David (1983) and David and Menchik (1985) also show that the
IA—11—
average amount of wealth of cohorts rises in old age. Shorrocks' (1975) panel
study of the estates of a single cohort in England indicates positive wealth
accumulation until age 70. Menchik and David's longitudinal analyses of
American estate data is most relevant for understanding U.S. savings
behavior. They examine the estates of four birth cohorts living in Wisconsin
in the period 1947 to 1978 and born between 1880 and 1925. In addition to
studying within cohort behavior, their analyses control for the lifetime
earnings of cohort members. Their results "fail to show individuals
decumulating wealth in old age.'
In contrast to these studies that of King and Dicks—Mireaux (1982), based
on cross section Canadian data, suggests a positive rate of decumulation in
old age. Burbidge and Robb (1985), on the other hand, reach a somewhat
different conclusion from an examination of King and Dicks—Mireaux's data.
They report old age asset decumulation only for blue collar workers. For
white collar workers the age wealth profile is flat between age 55 and 65 and
rises after age 65. Except for the study of King and Dicks-Mireaux, the only
other analysis that seems to confirm the Life Cycle Model's prediction of a
declining age wealth profile is the panel regression analys4s of Diamond and
Hausman (1984). However, as both Bernheim (1986) and Hurd (1986) point out,
their subsample from the National Longitudinal Survey may not be
representative. Indeed, Diamond and Hausman begin their analysis by excluding
low wealth households on the grounds that their behavior is inconsistent with
the assumptions of the Life Cycle Model. In addition, their data set is not
well suited to a study of the wealth of the elderly after they retire because
even at the end of the 10 year panel the ages of the sample range from 55 to
only 59.—12—
A number of questions can be raised about many of these analyses of the
age wealth profiles and saving rates of the aged. The cross section and
several of the cohort analyses (but not those of Menchik and David) may be
biased towards a slower rate of asset decumulation because the rich live
longer than the poor. In addition, the composition of the sample by age of
retirement changes with the age of the sample. Finally, many of these asset
decumulation studies fail to take account of the effects of social security
and private pensions. As Bernheim (1986) points out, the presence of future
social security and pension streams increases the rate of asset decumulation
implied by the life cycle model.
Probably the best analyses of asset changes among the aged are those of
Hurd (1986) and Bernheim (1986) both of which use the panel data in the
Retirement History Survey. While panel analysis permits holding constant the
individual household, one cannot be sure whether changes over time in wealth
reflect conscious household saving decisions or are merely the result of
unexpected capital gains or losses.
Bernheim considers changes in wealth over two periods, 1969 to 1975 and
1975 to 1979, for two samples of elderly, the retired and the non retired. He
also distinguishes between couples and single individuals. Bernheim's measure
of wealth change is the log of the ratio of wealth at the end of the period to
wealth at the beginning of the period.
For retired couples Bernheim reports a quite small average rate of asset
decumulation (a small average ratio of the logs) for the first period and a
small average rate of asset accumulation in the second period. Almost half of
retired couples in the earlier period and almost three fifths of couples in—13—
the latter period exhibited positive rates of asset accumulation. For
non retired couples the average rate of wealth change was positive in both
periods with roughly three fifths of the non retired elderly engaging in
positive accumulation. Non retired single individuals also had positive
accumulation on average in both periods, again with about three fifths
exhibiting positive saving. The only group whose average rate of wealth
change was negative in both periods is retired single individuals. This group
displayed a reasonably large rate of asset decumulation on average; but even
among this group over two fifths had positive saving.
Bernheim carefully considers these data in light of social security and
private pensions and states (1) that "the inclusion of annuities reinforces
earlier findings that resources decline only slightly, if at all, after
retirement" and (2) that "the pure life cycle hypothesis fails to account for
savings behavior after retirement.'t
Hurd reaches a different conclusion from Bernheim stating "contrary to
many results from cross-section data, the elderly do dissave." However, this
conclusion appears to be based on tabulations which exclude housing wealth.
In addition, onemayquestion Hurd's method of calculating wealth changes;
Hurd examines the change in average wealth rather than theaveragechange in
wealth. When Hurd includes housing wealth, he reports that average total real
wealth of all Retirement History Survey couples declined by only 2 percent
between1969and 1979. For single individuals Hurd reports a decline of 22.4
percent over the 10 year period in average total wealth. The corresponding
figures when housing wealth Is excluded are 14.5 percent for couples and 36.4
percent for singles.—14-
Hurd views the findings on non-housing wealth as most informative arguing
that increases in housing wealth in the 1970s reflect unexpected capital
gains. He fails to point out, however, that the reduction in non—housing
wealth over the period may reflect unexpected capital losses on stocks and
bonds. In addition, the elderly may well have responded to capital gains in
housing by accumulating less in other forms; i.e., in the absence of capital
gains in housing, non—housing wealth may have been larger.
Hurd's measure may also be more sensitive to measurement error than
Bernheim's; the level of average wealth in either 1969 or 1979 may be biased
because of outliers. Hurd has indicated (to the author) that the results
based on median wealth are similar, but his study, in contrast to that of
Bernheim, tells us little about the distribution of wealth changes across the
sample.
In sum, the panel studies of Bernheim and Hurd suggest little if any
total wealth decumulation of couples and some limited total wealth
decumulation of single individuals. In addition, Bernheim shows that a
sizeable function of singles as well as couples continues accumulating wealth
in old age.
E. Evidence from Annuity Markets
The strict life cycle model without allowance for bequest motives makes
strong predictions about the demand for annuities. Since the date of death is
uncertain and since bequests provide no utility, life cycle odels imply that
there should be a very strong demand for annuity insurance. Indeed, Kotlikoff
and Spivak (1981) demonstrate that for the commonly used time separable CES—15—
utility function of consumption andassuminga risk aversion coefficient of
1.75, the gain to a 55 yearoldwith average mortality probabilities from
obtaining access to an actuarially fair annuities market is equivalent to an
almost 70 percent increase in his lifetime resources in the absence of such
markets.
In fact, the demand for annuities appears to be very weak (3. Friedman
and Spivak, 1986). Friedman and Warshawsky (1984) report that the loads on
annuity insurance are no higher than theloadson other frequently purchased
types of insurance such as property and casualty insurance. Yet annuity
purchases are a rarity. Friedman and Wahrshawsky argue that it is necessary
to assume a fairly strong bequest motive to explain this behavior. Friedman
and Wahrshawsky do not, however, take into account uncertainty with respect to
inflation risk, which may explain the reluctance of many to purchase nominal
annuities. In addition, totally annuitizing one's wealth might leave one
illiquid and unable to pay major one time expenses suchasmedical care.
Still, thevirtual nonexistence of annuity insurance is quite surprising.
kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) advance a possible alternative explanation,
namely that families will self insure to a large extent when annuity insurance
is only available on very unfavorable terms; family insurance, however, does
not appear capable of fully accounting for the widespread failure to
annuitize. Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) review a number of settings
where annuities are available on a fair or even subsidized basis and report
that even in these cases there is little demand for annuities. They conclude
from this evidence that many consumers must have significant bequestmotives.
Their strongest evidence comes from TIAA-CREF's 1973 Survey of Beneficiaries.—16—
In this survey over 70 percent of beneficiaries chose plans other than those
providing full annuity protection despite the fact that TIAA—CREF annuities
appear to be quite close to actuarially fair.
F.Historical Evidence
The essential prediction of the life cycle theory is that people save to
prepare for their retirement when they must dissave and consume. Without
periods of retirement, or at least, significant decreased labor earnings at
the end of life there is no life cycle motive for saving. Yet there were
substantial positive net national saving rates (net national saving divided by
net national product) over the period 1870 to 1930 when retirement was much
less common than it is today.
As Ransom and Sutch (1986) show, there was some retirement in the latter
part of the last century and the pre—Depression years of this century, but the
retirement rate of the elderly was small, especially when compared with
current rates. During the period 1870 to 1930 the labor force participation
rate of males 60 and older was essentially constant at 64 to 65 percent. In
contrast, the current rate for males 60 and older is 30 percent; for males 65
and older the 1900 Ransom-Sutch estimate is 58 percent compared with a current
rate of 17.5 percent. Life expectancy for age 20 males during the period 1870
to 1930 appears to have been about 65; for much of the post war period it has
been above 70.
Despite this significant increase in the length of retirement, the saving
rate in recent decades has been substantially smaller than that observed
between 1870 and 1930. The average saving rate, defined as net national—17—
savingdivided by net national product, recorded from 1870 to 1930 is close to
50 percent greater than the average saving rate in the post war period.2 In
contrast to the Life Cycle Model, at least one class of bequests models
suggests that saving rates may rise with the length of retirement (Skinner,
1985).
Of course, much besides the length of retirement changed over the last
century, so the negative correlation between the saving rate and the length of
retirement may be spurious. It is, therefore, also useful to examine this
correlation over shorter periods. Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) report that
since 1950 the expected duration of retirement and other nonworking periods
for the average adult has almost doubled. This change coincided with a
secular decline of almost 40 percent in the net national saving rate. Of
course, the introduction of unfunded Social Security (Feldstein, 1974) and
other government policies may have reduced saving since 1950, but the life
cycle model would still predict a quite substantial offsetting impact arising
from the change in retirement (kotlikoff. 1979);
II. Understanding Intergenerational Transfers
A. Explanations for Intergenerational Transfers
Altruistic concern for one's children is the first reason one thinks of
for intergenerational transfers. This concern may be expressed mathematically
as the parent having direct utility for the utility of the child as in Barro
(1974) and Becker (1974). An alternative, nonaltruistic model of bequests
(Yarn (1966) and Blinder (1973)) is that parents care about thelevelof the
bequest perse.But a utility of thesizeof thebequestmodel seems-18-
implausible because it implies that the parent's transfer to the child is
independent of the child's economic circumstances.
The altruistic model also seems somewhat implausible because it has such
strong neutrality predictions. As is well known, Barro (1984) showed that
intergenerational transfers by the government are completely neutralized
because parents internalize the effects on all future generations of such
transfers. More recently Kotlikoff (1983) and Bernheim and Bagwell (1985)
independently showed that marriage may altruistically link large numbers of
parents and other extended family members (if not the entire planet), with the
implication that intragenerational government transfers will also be entirely
neutralized. The utility of the child's consumption model also appears to
have strong neutrality properties.
The neutrality properties of the altruistic models hold only if
transferors are not constrained in their transfers. As an example of such
constraints, suppose an altruistic parent would like to transfer from her
children to herself, and the parent can not compel her children to make such
transfers; in this situation, government redistribution from that parent to
her child will have real effects.
An alternative view of transfers from parents to children, which has
nothing to do with parental concern for children or a desire per se to leave
bequests, is that parents and children form an incomplete annuities market
(Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1961). According to this view parents and children
enter into implicit risk sharing arrangements. The risk to be shared is the
parent's longevity risk. The arrangement involves parents agreeing to
transfer their assets to their children at death as a quid pro quo for support—19—
payments from the children if the parents live longer than expected.
Enforcement of such arrangements is enhanced by having the child makepayments
to the parent each year, rather than wait until the parent runs out of
resources.
Kotlikoff, Shoven. and Spivak (1985) demonstrate that significant
intergenerational transfers could arise in the aggregate in a dynamic
equilibrium model of imperfect family annuity insurance. Indeed, they point
out that such a model could explain much of the 80—20 split of transfer and
life cycle wealth reported by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981). This point is
important; it indicates that although intergenerational transfers may be large
in the aggregate, fundamental preferences may still correspond to those
posited in the generationally selfish life cycle model.
Other researchers, including Sheshinski and Weiss (1981), Davies (1981),
Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled (1983), Abel (1983), and Hubbard (1984a,
1984b), have exarined the potential for intergenerational transfers when no
annuity insurance whatsoever, including Implicit family insurance, is
available. These studies also demonstrate clearly that significant
intergenerational transfers can arise in the life cycle model if annuity
insurance is unavailable.3
Even if the life span were certain, individuals may save significant sums
for the possibility of substantial end of life medical and nursing home
expenses. If such medical problems do not arise, the elderly individual may
be unable to consume this nest egg before he or she dies, and, consequently, a
bequest will arise.
Other individuals .ay simply strike it rich in their professions and
Investments and find themselves unable to consume all their resources. It's-20—
clear that consumption satiation does occur; there are enough examples of
extremely wealthy individuals, many who are quite young, who are unable to
consume their wealth over their lifetime, especially when one properly
measures consumption as excluding expenditures on durables, but including
imputed rent on durables. Additional research is needed to determine how
substantial windfalls influence total wealth accumulation. While there is
some contradictory evidence concerning the bequest—resource elasticity
(Menchik and David, 1983; Kotlikoff, 1977), this elasticity surely exceeds
unity for the super wealthy.
Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) advance a forth explanation for
intergenerational transfers, namely as the implicit payment by parents to
their children for providing in kind services, such as assisting them with
chores, trips to the doctor, etc. While some intergenerational transfers
surely arise as payments for child provided services, it seems quite unlikely
that such transfers would be very large in the aggregate.
Each of these explanations of intergenerational transfers presumably-
plays some role in explaining aggregate transfers; in addition, there are
probably many traditional life cycle households that are well annuitized
through private pensions and Social Security and, consequently leave no
intergenerational transfers. This heterogenous view of preferences and
insurance arrangements is espoused by Kurz (1984).
B. Empirical Tests of Alternative Models of Intergenerational Transfers
Empirical analysis of intergenerational transfers has been greatly
limited by the available data. To test models of altruism or family insurance—21—
arrangements one needs data not only on the transfers, consumption choices,
and resources of parents, but also those of adult children; i.e., one needs
information on the extended family. At the present time there simply are no
suitable data sets covering the extended family.
There are, however, data on intervivos transfers and bequests. In his
analysis of 379 Connecticut estates with bequests to children with siblings
Menchik (1980) finds strong evidence that "wealth bequeathed to children is
shared equally." This study confirmed earlier findings by Sussman, et al.
(1970) and Brittain (1978). On the other hand, Tomes' (1981) findings based
on recall data from Cleveland contradict the equal bequest view; but in 1985
Menchik (1985) sampled actual probate records in Cleveland and found equal
division in 93 percent of the cases. The finding of equal bequests strongly
contradicts the prediction of the altruistic .odel which predicts that
differences in bequests would compensate for differences in children's
earnings capacities. Donald Cox (1987) reports another finding at odds with
altruism, namely that transfers are positively related to the recipient's
income level.
Hurd (1986) also finds evidence against the utility of bequest model, and
indirectly against the altruism model. Hurd points out that parents with
bequest motives should consume their end of life resources at a slower rate
than those with bequest motives. He then compares the rate of asset
decumulatlon of the elderly who have children with those who do not. He finds
no si9niflcant difference in the rate of asset decumulation a.ong the two
groups.
Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers (1985) report that In settings with two
or more children, children of richer parents spend more time with their—22—
parents than children of poorer parents. In contrast, they find no
significant impact of parental wealth on the visitation of only children. The
authors view these findings as strong support for their •odel in which parents
with two or more children credibly threaten to disinherit those children who
are insufficiently attentive. These findings, while suggestive, must be
viewed as preliminary; further analysis, taking account of childrens' own
wealth position, is needed.
In addition to these micro analyses of intergenerational transfers,
Boskin and Kotlikoff (1985) use time series data to test directly one of the
key neutrality propositions of the altruism model, namely that aggregated
consumption is independent of the age distribution of resources. Their model
assumes extended families have identical Barro type preferences and identical
demographic structures. Under these assumptions aggregate household
consumption depends simply on the present value of aggregate human wealth,
plus national net worth, less the present value of future government
consumption. It is independent of the age distribution of resources. 805km
and Kotlikoff show that given the appropriate resource variables, the age
composition of income still significantly influences aggregate consumption.
Thus they reject their admittedly stylized model of intergenerational
altruism.
III. Conclusion
Like most good puzzles, the saving puzzle has a lot of pieces, many of
which don't seem to fit together. It seems well established that
intergenerational transfers are sizeable and that the process leading to—23—
these transfers is responsible for a sizeable amount of wealth accumulation.
The precise explanation for these transfers remains unclear.
Intergenerational altruism might appear the most likely candidate, but at
least some stylized facts, such as the equal allocation of bequests among
children, are strongly at odds with the altruism model. Other explanations
involving imperfect insurance arrangements or payments for child services do
not appear capable of explaining the substantial amounts of transfers actually
observed. Sorting àut the relative contributions of different models to
intergenerational transfers and the precise role of intergenerational
transfers in the process of wealth accumulation remains an intriguing and
exciting enterprise.-24—
Footnotes
1. Modigliani (1984) prefers a different definition of life cycle wealth,
Lme where Lm equals the sum over cohorts of the sum of saving at each age, and
saving is defined as income less consumption. The problem with his definition
is that income may include capital income earned on previously received
intergenerational transfers. Hence, since income itself may reflect
intergenerational transfers, the sum of saving out of income can not be used
to test with maximum power the null hypothesis that the zero transfer life
cycle model accounts for essentially all of U.S. wealth. Stated differently,
under the null hypothesis, Lm =L,but if there are significant
intergenerational transfers Lm could be close to W, although both Lm and 14
would be substantially different from L.Indeed, Ando (1986) reports
calculations of L equal to 85 percent to 75 percent of W for the period 1960
to 1910, while our 1974 calculation of L is only 21.9 percent of 1974 W.
2.Historical Statistics, p. 231, and The 1987 Economic Report of the
President.
3. I find these life cycle models somewhat unsatisfactory because they simply
assume away annuity insurance despite the fact that life cycle agents will have
very substantial demands for annuities. In addition, the bequests arising in
these models are arbitrarily allocated to children despite the tact that the
parents have no bequest motive.—25—
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